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The Wagner Act: Labor Law's Signal Event
by Theodore J. St. Antoine
Degan Professor of Law and former Dean, University of Michigan Law School
here's no fun in stating the
obvious. Sophisticated profes-
sionals bestow few kudos on
those who declaim the conventional
wisdom. Even so, one would havc to
be far more perverse than I, in this fif-
tieth anniversary year of the National
Labor Relations Act, to suggest that the
Wagner Act, wasn't the most important
(and at the time of it- passage the most
controversial) development in the last
half-century of labor law.
Today a bold young group of
scholars who call themselves critical
legal theorists insist that the Wagner
Act was the most radical piece of leg-
islation ever adopted by Congress. It
had the potential, they say, to trans-
form the American workplace, break-
ing down age-old patterns of hierarchi-
cal domination and elevating the rank-
and-file worker to a position of author-
ity rivaling that of management.
In this view, a seemingly pro-
gressive but ultimately conservative
and hostile U.S. Supreme Court
thwarted the design of the statute. The
strike weapon was sapped of much of
its force by the license granted
employers to replace strikers per-
manently, workers were denied prop-
erty rights in their jobs, and unions
were installed as management's en-
forcers of order and discipline on the
shop floor.
But if the Wagner Act's actual ac-
complishments pale by comparison
with the visionary goals claimed for it
by the critical legal theorists, the stat-
ute's impact on American society was
still profound and long-lasting. And it
was not accepted without a stiff fight.
Shortly after passage of the
Wagner Act, a blue-ribbon panel of
corporate lawyers advised their clients
that they could safely ignore its pro-
hibition of employer reprisals against
employees for joining unions or engag-
ing in strikes, and its requirement of
collective bargaining with majority
representatives. That was not unrea-
sonable advice, in light of existing
precedent on the scope of the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion. Indeed, the Supreme Court even-
tually upheld the validity of the
Wagner Act by the narrowest possible
margin, five votes to four.2
The effect of the new legislation
may have been almost as much psy-
chological as legal. Workers' plac-
ards in the coal fields, for example,
proudly proclaimed, "President
Roosevelt wants you to join the union."
If not literally true, that boast was wall
within the bounds of poetic license.
Section 1 of the Wagner Act declared
the policy of the United States to be
one of "encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining."
Sparked by this governmental en-
dorsement, the labor movement went
on to enjoy the most spectacular
decade of growth in its history. Union
membership, 2.9 million (11.5 percent
of nonagricultural employment) in
1933, increased five-fold by 1945 to
14.8 million (35.8 percent of non-10-
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agricultural employment).
The massive wave of strikes which
swept the country at the end of World
War I dramatically changed grass-
roots attitudes toward unionism. The
Taft-Hartley Act of 19471 rewrote the
National Labor Relations Act, inserting
a code of union unfair labor practices
and limiting one of labor's major
organizing devices, the secondary
boycott. Further restrictions on the
boycott and on organizRtional
picketing were added in 1959.
Enactment of Taft-Hartley coin-
cided with an abrupt halt in the for-
ward progress of unionization
throughout the country. The decline
has continued almost uninterruptedly
since then. By the early 1980s, al-
though total union membership was
approximately 20 million, the labor
force had expanded so much more
rapidly that the union share of
nonagricultural employment had
fallen to about 22 percent. Were it not
for the remarkable growth of public
employee unionism during the past
two decades, the figures would be even
moro devastating.
A principal reason for this de-
crease, undoubtedly, is the continuing
shift of jobs from the blue-collar to the
white-collar sectors. Nonetheless,
various studies (including com-
parisons of the superior membership
gains of unions in Canada and most
other Western nations) suggest that
Taft-Hartley and amendments to it may
have played a substantial role in im-
peding organization.
Ideally, our labor laws should be
closely attuned to the needs of workers
and unions in using persuasion and
certain economic weapons to organize
and bargain effectively, and to the
competing interests of employers,
employees, and the general public in
being free from injurious pressures.
Much evidence suggests that these
needs and interests may differ con-
siderably from industry to industry,
and that different balances should be
struck accordingly. This now is done
to some extent in construction and
garment manufacturing.
Even within the existing statutory
pattern, the NLRB and the courts
ought to pay less heed to armchair
speculation, and more to particular
facts and empirical studies, in assess-
ing union and employer conduct.
Arguably, both sides have suffered as
a result of administrative or judicial
unwillingness to grub for a better
sense of the real impact of such tac-
tics as lockouts, "hard bargaining"
and employer communications, and
limited union access to employees in
organizing campaigns.
Grave procedural and remedial
deficiencies remain in the National
Labor Relations Act. The NLRB's proc-
esses are clogged by an overwhelming
number of cases and by lack of discre-
tion to deny review of trial-level deci-
sions. An intransigent employer can
evade for years, if not indefinitely, its
duty to bargain with a majority union,
and the employees receive no mone-
tary award for the contract benefits
they presumably have lost.
The focus of public interest in
labor relations, and the corresponding
focus of our enacted legislation, has
shifted significantly over the decades.
From the thirties through the fifties,
the emphasis was on workers' institu-
tional rights, their freedom to organize
or not without employer or union
coercion, and their entitlement to
democratically run unions. In the six-
ties and the seventies, the emphasis
was on workers' individual rights.
They were entitled to equal employ-
ment opportunity, to a safe place to
work, to various safeguards for their
pensions and similar employee bene-
fits. In the foreseeable future even the
nonunionized worker may win protec-
tion against arbitrary and unjust
discipline.
Yet perhaps one may still harbor
the hope that this quite healthy con-
cern for individuals will not wholly
obliterate concern for organizations.
The post-industrial world, hardly less
than the industrial world, may be a
bleak place for the isolated individual.
Whether ca~led a guild, a union, or a
professional society, a settled institu-
tional means has usually afforded
working people the fullest expression
of their common goals and the greatest
capacity for realizing them. Neither
the worker nor society should forget
that basic lesson of the Wagner Act. U
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